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Shuiyin Liu, Yi Hong, and Emanuele Viterbo
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the use of artificial noise for secure communications. We propose the
notion of practical secrecy as a new design criterion based on the behavior of the eavesdropper’s error
probability PE, as the signal-to-noise ratio goes to infinity. We then show that the practical secrecy can be
guaranteed by the randomly distributed artificial noise with specified power. We show that it is possible
to achieve practical secrecy even when the eavesdropper can afford more antennas than the transmitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast characteristic of wireless communication systems results in enormous challenges in
securing transmitted data in the presence of eavesdroppers. The eavesdropper is commonly assumed to be
passive and its location is unknown to the transmitter. In current wireless systems, secure communication
mainly depends on the network layer cryptographic technologies. Information theoretic results show that
it is possible to secure the data by employing physical layer strategy [1], when the intended receiver has
a better channel than the eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity is thus defined to measure the difference
between the capacities of the intended user and the eavesdropper [2].
A recently proposed physical layer security scheme makes use of artificial noise to degrade the
eavesdropper’s reception [3]. The intended user is unaffected, so that a non-zero secrecy rate is ensured.
The approach assumes a Gaussian artificial noise and requires that the number of eavesdropper antennas
NE is strictly smaller than the number of transmitter antennas NA. In this paper we tackle this problem. To
overcome the restriction NE < NA, we aim at maximizing the eavesdropper’s error probability, defined by
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2PE, rather than the secrecy rate. Hence, we define the notion of practical secrecy as PE → 1 exponentially
as the number of receiver antennas NB → ∞, for any signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the eavesdropper.
The proposed criterion is different from the secrecy gain introduced in [4], where PE → 0 for high
eavesdropper SNR. More importantly, we propose the covering ratio as a fundamental secrecy parameter
which guarantees the convergence of PE and characterizes the amount of the artificial noise required.
Furthermore, we propose lattice precoding to improve performance over singular value decomposition
(SVD) precoding used in [3].
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the transmission model and lattice basics. The
SVD precoding and the lattice precoding are given in Section III. In Section IV, practical secrecy is
addressed. Section V presents some simulation results. Some concluding remarks are drawn in Section
VI. Proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper and lowercase boldface letters, and the
transpose, inverse, pseudoinverse of a matrix B by BT , B−1, and B†, respectively. X → Y denotes
that random variable X converges to random variable Y in distribution. We use the standard asymptotic
notation f (x) = O (g (x)), when lim supx→∞ |f(x)/g(x)| < ∞. R, C, Z and Z [i] represent the real,
complex, integer and complex integer numbers, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND LATTICE PRELIMINARY
We consider the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel using the M-QAM signalling.
The precoding and decoding problems in this system can be easily modeled using lattices [5][6]. In what
follows, the system model is introduced first, followed by some lattice preliminaries that are relevant to
this paper.
A. System Model
Consider a MIMO wiretap system including three terminals: a transmitter Alice, an intended receiver
Bob, and a passive eavesdropper Eve, which are equipped with NA, NB and NE antennas, respectively.
Bob and Eve receive
z= Hx+ nB, (1)
y= Gx+ nE, (2)
respectively, where nB ∈ CNB×1 and nE ∈ CNE×1 are the complex white Gaussian noise vectors with
i.i.d. entries ∼ NC(0, σ2B) and NC(0, σ2E), respectively. Assuming Bob and Eve are not co-located, then
the mutually independent matrices H ∈ CNB×NA and G ∈ CNE×NA represent the channels from Alice
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3to Bob and Alice to Eve, respectively, where the entries are assumed to be i.i.d. circularly symmetric
Gaussian random variable ∼ NC(0, 1).
We assume NB < NA, so that H has a non-trivial null space generated by the columns of the matrix
Z = null(H). Let u be the secret data vector. Using the artificial noise technique, Alice sends
x = Pu+ Zv, (3)
where P is the precoding matrix and v is the artificial noise generated by Alice. Considering uniform
M -QAM signalling, we have the secret data ℜ(u) and ℑ(u) ∈ CNB , where C ={−√M + 1, −√M + 3
. . . ,
√
M − 1}. The total transmit power is constrained to P , i.e., E[||x||2] ≤ P .
Then, (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
z= HPu+ nB (4)
y= GPu+GZv + nE. (5)
We consider the worse case for Alice where Eve not only knows the channel matrices H and G, but
also knows the matrix Z and the precoding matrix P. Alice is assumed to know only H. The SNR of
Eve is defined as SNRE , P/σ2E. From (4) and (5), through the interference term GZv, we can see that
v affects Eve, but not Bob.
B. Lattice Preliminary
An n-dimensional real lattice in an m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm (n ≤ m) is the set of integer
linear combinations of n independent vectors:
ΛR = {Bu : u ∈ Zn} ,
where B = [b1 · · ·bn] is a basis of the lattice ΛR.
In the following, we introduce some lattice parameters which are related to this work.
A shortest vector of ΛR is a non-zero vector in ΛR with the smallest Euclidean norm. The length of
the shortest vector is denoted by λ1 (B).
The Voronoi region of a lattice point xi is denoted by:
V (ΛR) = {y ∈ Rm: ‖y − xi‖ ≤ ‖y − xj‖,∀ xi 6= xj} .
The determinant of ΛR, det(ΛR) ,
√
det(BTB), gives the n-dimensional volume of V (ΛR).
In Fig. 1, we illustrate two important lattice parameters which are related to V (ΛR):
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Fig. 1. Voronoi Cell, Effective Radius and Covering Radius.
1) the effective radius of ΛR, denoted by reff(ΛR), is the radius of a sphere Seff(ΛR) of volume det(ΛR)
[7]. For large n, it is approximately
reff(ΛR) ≈
√
n/(2pie) det(ΛR)
1/n;
2) the covering radius of ΛR, denoted by rcov(ΛR), is the radius of the smallest sphere centred at a
lattice point which covers V (ΛR).
In wireless communication, it is common to use complex number representation of signals. The real
lattice definition can be extended to complex:
ΛC = {BCuC : uC∈ Z [i]n} ,
where BC ∈ Cm×n is a basis of the complex lattice ΛC. There is a simple way to represent n-dimensional
complex lattices as 2n-dimensional real lattices [8]. In this work, when we use the lattice parameters
of ΛC (e.g., V (ΛC)), we first convert ΛC to the real equivalent ΛR, and then apply the corresponding
definitions of ΛR.
From the lattice viewpoint, GPu in (5) can be described as a point of the lattice with a basis GP.
The detection of u fits in the lattice decoding scenario and can be solved by sphere decoding [9]. In this
paper, we assume the worst-case for Alice and Bob, where Eve is able to perform maximum likelihood
decoding (e.g., by sphere decoding) to estimate u, even if the average complexity grows exponentially
with the lattice dimension.
III. PRECODING FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION
In this Section, we analyze two different precoding schemes for the artificial noise strategy: SVD
precoding and lattice precoding.
For the MIMO scenario, the original artificial noise stragegy [3] uses SVD precoding, whereH = UΛVT ,
V = [V1, Z] and P = V1. Due to the orthogonality between P and Z, from (3), the total transmission
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5power is
||xSVD||2 = ||u||2 + ||vSVD||2. (6)
Different from SVD precoding, lattice precoding [5] transmits
xLP= H
†(u−Awˆ) + Zv, (7)
where A = 2
√
M and
wˆ = arg min
w∈Z[i]NB
‖H†(u−Aw)‖2. (8)
Hence the corresponding transmission power is
||xLP||2 = ||H†(u−Awˆ)||2 + ||vLP||2. (9)
The search in (8) requires the use of sphere decoder. To speed up the search process, we apply
the lattice reduction aided successive interference cancellation (LR-SIC) precoding [10], in which wˆ is
approximated by Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [11].
In the next Section, we will show that lattice precoding outperforms SVD precoding by requiring lower
artificial noise power.
IV. PRACTICAL SECRECY
In this Section, we propose a new artificial noise strategy to overcome the limitation of NE < NA
and the assumption of Gaussian artificial noise in [3]. Instead of targeting a non-zero secrecy rate, the
proposed scheme aims to maximize Eve’s error probability PE , Pr(uˆE 6= u).
A. Practical Secrecy
Let uˆE be the estimated secret message at Eve. We propose a new measure of secrecy in terms of PE.
Definition 1: We say practical secrecy is achieved if for any SNRE, PE → 1 exponentially as NB →∞.
The traditional secrecy capacity criterion, is based on the assumption of a Gaussian input alphabet. On
the contrary, practical secrecy is proposed for the practical communication systems, which make use of
a finite alphabet (e.g., M -QAM).
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no scheme has been proposed in the literature to achieve
practical secrecy. In the following, we will evaluate the relationship between practical secrecy and v
under the assumption that Eve can perform maximum likelihood decoding.
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6B. Achieving Practical Secrecy
Consider the lattice ΛC with a basis GP. The decoding region of the target lattice point GPu is
its associated V (ΛC). Therefore, PE is determined by whether y in (5) belongs to V (ΛC) or not. Let
n˜E = GZv + nE be Eve’s generalized noise term. For a given v, the entries of n˜E are i.i.d. random
variables ∼ NC(0, σ˜2E) with σ˜2E = ||v||2 + σ2E. A salient feature is that Eve’s channel noise nE can help
Alice to save on the artificial noise power. In this work, we consider the worst-case scenario, i.e., σ2E → 0,
so that PE only depends on GZv and is independent of SNRE.
As shown in Fig. 1, if the interference term ||GZv|| ≥ rcov(ΛC), then y /∈ V (ΛC), so that PE = 1. If
rcov(ΛC)
reff(ΛC)
≥ ||GZv||
reff(ΛC)
> 1, (10)
there are two cases: PE = 1 when y ∈ S¯eff(ΛC)−V (ΛC) and PE = 0 when y ∈ V (ΛC)−Seff(ΛC) (the
shaded corners), where S¯eff(ΛC) is the complement of Seff(ΛC). As ||GZv|| approaches rcov(ΛC), the
shaded corners will disappear. In other words, Eve has a higher error floor as ||GZv|| increases from
reff(ΛC) to rcov(ΛC). Note that the idea is directly applicable to lattice precoding, where the target lattice
point GPu is simply replaced by the lattice point GH† (u−Awˆ). The secret data therefore becomes
u−Awˆ.
Inspired by (10), we now introduce a new secrecy parameter related to PE.
Definition 2: The covering ratio is defined as
cR ,
||GZv||
reff(ΛC)
. (11)
The cR and PE are related by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For cR ≥ pie and NB →∞, PE = 1 for any value of SNRE.
Proof: See Appendix A.
To apply Theorem 1, we need to find the sufficient condition of cR ≥ pie. Since cR is a random variable
depending on the random channel matrix G, the problem then reduces to finding the sufficient condition
on Pr{cR < β} → 0 for some β > 0.
Theorem 2: For NB →∞, let ||v|| = βe/Φ, where
ΦLP =
[
(NE −NB)!
(NA −NB)! ·
NA!
NE!
] 1
2NB for lattice
precoding
(12)
ΦSVD =
[
(NE −NB)!
NE!
·NB1/2
] 1
2NB for SVD
precoding
(13)
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7then
Pr{cR < β} ≤ O
(
e−min(N
2
B/ log(NB), NE)
)
. (14)
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 1 with β = pie and 2, the convergence behavior of Pr{cR < pie} implies PE → 1
exponentially as NB →∞.
Remark 1: Practical secrecy is achieved when ||v|| ≥ pie2/Φ, where Φ is given in (12) and (13),
depending on precoders.
Remark 2: Since ΦSVD < ΦLP, ||vSVD|| > ||vLP||.
As shown above, practical secrecy is only related to ||v||. However, if v is an integer vector, the term
x˜ = GPu+GZv in (5) can be viewed as a lattice point of Λ˜C with a basis [GP, GZ], so that Eve
may be able to recover x˜ by using sphere decoding. To avoid this, we generate a continuous random
vector v, so that x˜ can never be a lattice point of Λ˜C, hence can not be detected.
Since practical secrecy requires that PE approaches 1 exponentially, it implies that even for small
values of NB the PE is very close to 1. The simulation in the following section shows that our analysis
is applicable to a real system with finite numbers of antennas, even with NE > NA.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section examines the performance of the proposed artificial noise scheme in the most favorable
case for Eve, i.e., SNRE → ∞. We construct v in two steps: 1) generating a vector with NA − NB
uniformly distributed random variables; 2) normalizing the length of the random vector to βe/Φ.
Fig. 2 shows the error performances at Bob and Eve for an uncoded system using 64-QAM with
NA = 10, NB = 9 and NE = 20. Reference [3] argued that the non-zero secrecy rate can not be
guaranteed when NA < NE. Nevertheless, our practical secrecy criterion provides the opportunity to
protect u in these scenarios. With β = 1, the result in Fig. 2 shows PE = 1, even when NA −NB = 1.
We find that β = 1 is already good enough in practice. Pr(cR < β) is shown to decay very fast. Observe
that the performance of lattice precoding is considerably better than that of SVD precoding.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown how the artificial noise can force Eve’s received signal to settle around
the borders of the decision region, so that the practical secrecy can be achieved. Of particular interest
is that even if only one degree of freedom is used for artificial noise (NA − NB = 1) and Eve has
unlimited resources (NE > NA), the data can still be protected. The connection between secrecy capacity
and practical secrecy, as well as the effect of finite NB, will be investigated in the future work.
June 20, 2018 DRAFT
86 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
Eb/N0 (dB)
P
r
(uˆ
6=
u
)
 
 
Eve: SVD Precoding
Eve: LR−SIC Precoding
Eve: Sphere Precoding
Bob: SVD Precoding
Bob: LR−SIC Precoding
Bob: Sphere Precoding
Fig. 2. Pr (uˆ 6= u) vs. Bob’s average SNR per bit for the uncoded MIMO system with NA = 10, NB = 9, NE = 20, 64-QAM
and SNRE →∞.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let B = GP. We recall the fact [12]:
rcov(B) ≤ NB
λ1((B†)T )
. (15)
It is known that for a random lattice basis B and NB →∞, λ1((B†)T ) converges to [13]√
NB/(pie)
∣∣∣det((B†)T )∣∣∣1/NB . (16)
Consequently, the right hand side of (15) tends towards
√
pieNB
|det((B†)T )|1/NB
= piereff(B). (17)
If cR > pie, using (11), we have ||GZv|| >rcov(B), which means y /∈ V (ΛC), so that PE = 1. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
1) Lattice precoding: Performing the QR decomposition yieldsHT = QHRH, whereQH has orthogonal
columns and RH is an upper triangular matrix with nonnegative diagonal elements. We have
cR =
||GZv||det(RH)1/NB√
NB
pie |det(GQH)|1/NB
. (18)
We recall the facts that QH is independent of RH [14], and GZ and GQH are mutually independent
Gaussian random matrices [15]. Consequently, ||GZv||, det(GQH)1/NB and det(RH)1/NB are mutually
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9independent random variable. It is easy to verify that
√
2
||v|| ||GZv|| is a X distributed random variable
with 2NE degrees of freedom, i.e., √
2
||v|| ||GZv|| → X (2NE). (19)
According to [16] , for NB →∞, we have
log |det(RH)| − 1/2 log NA!(NA−NB)! + 1/4 log(NB)
1/2
√
log(NB)
→ N (0, 1). (20)
Multiplying the numerator and denominator in (20) by 1/NB, we obtain
det(RH)
1/NB → eN (0, 14N−2B log(NB))
[
NA!
N
1/2
B (NA −NB)!
] 1
2NB
. (21)
Similarly, since GQH is a Gaussian random matrix, for NB →∞, we have
det(GQH)
1/NB → eN (0, 14N−2B log(NB))
[
NE!
N
1/2
B (NE −NB)!
] 1
2NB
. (22)
According to (19), (21) and (22), the right hand side of (18) converges to the product of two random
variables fX · fN , where
fX =
||v||√
2NB
ΦLPX (2NE),
fN =
√
pie exp(N (0, 1
2
N−2B log(NB))), (23)
with ΦLP given in (12). Now we compute the probability of fX · fN ≤ β. We have
Pr {fX · fN ≤ β} ≤ Pr{fX ≤ β}+Pr{fN ≤ 1}. (24)
We first compute the probability of fN ≤ 1:
Pr{fN ≤ 1} = Pr
{
N (0, 1
2
N−2B log(NB)) ≤ −
1
2
log pie
}
≤ 1/2 exp
(
−N
2
B log
2 pie
4 log(NB)
)
≤ O
(
e−N
2
B/ log(NB)
)
. (25)
Then, we compute the probability of fX ≤ β:
Pr{fX ≤ β} = Pr
{
X 2(2NE) ≤ 2β
2NB
||v||2Φ2LP
}
. (26)
Let ||v|| = βeΦLP . Since
2β2NB
||v||2Φ2LP =
2NB
e2 < 2NE, we have
Pr
{
X 2(2NE) ≤ 2NB
e2
}
≤ (γe1−γ)NE , (27)
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where γ = NBe2NE . It is easy to show that
Pr
{
X 2(2NE) ≤ 2NB
e2
}
≤
[
e2NE
e1−γNB
]−NE
≤ O(e−NE). (28)
Therefore, with ||v|| = βeΦLP
Pr{cR < β} = Pr{fX · fN < β}
≤ O
(
e−min(N
2
B/ log(NB), NE)
)
. (29)
2) SVD precoding: The proof is similar to the above. 
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